reinforce these values and lead to social action, and the historical identification of Jews with socialist causes in Europe (Legge, 1995; Levey, 1996; Weisberg and Sylvan, 2003) .
The commitment to a progressive agenda, especially one based upon social issues, puts Jews at one end of the "culture wars" in American politics. Christian fundamentalists are at the other pole (Layman and Green, in press) , so the wariness of Jews about the Christian right is understandable on policy grounds alone. Attitudes toward fundamentalists have become linked with positions on issues such as gay rights, abortion policy, and feminism for the larger electorate since the 1980s and the connections have become increasingly tight since then (Bolce and DiMaio, 1999; Miller, Wlezien, and Hildreth, 1991 , 1139 -1140 . Non-Jews rate evangelicals positively on balance and those who have negative views are overwhelmingly on the left on social issues.
Jews may be more liberal than other Americans, especially on social policy. Yet, the culture war thesis is not sufficient to account for why Jews are more loyalty to the Democratic party than other groups. Jews are far more united in their negative evaluations of evangelicals than are non-Jews -and this wariness toward fundamentalists is only weakly linked to attitudes on social issues. Jewish concern for the rights of groups that have faced discrimination is distinct from Jewish concern about their own political and social fate in contemporary American politics. The social liberalism of American Jews is rooted in the long history of discrimination against Jews throughout the world. The fear of evangelicals is based not on worries about whether Jews will achieve material success. Most American Jews take such success for granted.
Nor is it based upon a social conscience. Instead, it reflects the persistence of Jewish 4 identification as outsiders-as someone whose culture and traditions, if not material success, may be under threat. Jews do not fear pogroms, as in Russia or Nazi Germany. But, as the American Jewish population has declined and more Jews turn away from their faith, those who still hold to their tradition worry about social and political forces that might induce others to convert. This fear of evangelicals, with their message that Jews must accept Jesus Christ to enter heaven, is more based upon self-interest than social justice. We shall argue that this concern over the importance of fundamentalists in American politics generally and in the Republican party more specifically leads to Jewish solidarity with the Democratic party above and beyond the issue disagreements with the Christian right on social issues. The rising influence of fundamentalists within the Republican party is a key factor in both why Jews voted Democratic in 2004-and why some Jews who strayed from this path in 2000 returned to the fold four years later.
The evangelical threat to Jewish identity leads to greater group cohesion, social identity theory and literature on racial discrimination tells us. Jews respond to many of the same social forces as African-Americans, where a sense of shared fate with other blacks leads to greater issue accord and continued attachment to the Democratic party (Dawson, 1994) .
In 2004, as in some previous elections, there was a countervailing force pushing a small number of Jews to the Republican party: support for Israel and the related concern for terrorism. Conover (1988, 65) argues that groups define themselves politically on issues that are at the core of their identities. Outgroups often form the focal point of group thinking about politics; when the in-group (Jews) believe that the outgroup threatens (or is "negatively interdependent"
with the in-group) its long-term fate, the outgroup may become a critical element in the in-group schema. This conceptual scheme is derived from social identity theory (Tajfel, 1982; Turner et al., 1987, among others) and revisionist work on racial prejudice. Blumer (1958, 5) characterized the roots of prejudice as "a felt challenge to [a] sense of group position." It is the foundation of how minorities, especially African-Americans, perceive their social status (Bobo and Hutchings, 1996) and their political world. Dawson (1987, chs. 4 and 6) traces African-American liberalism (and through ideology, attachment to the Democratic party) to a sense of "shared fate" with other blacks-in contrast to a weaker sense of group identity. Blacks who see a common destiny with other African-Americans are more likely to define their political interests in terms of race (Dawson, 1987, ch. 5 ).
For many years and across countries, Jewish political preferences have been shaped by perceptions of threat from other groups (Medding, 1977) . In the United States today, Jews see Christian fundamentalists as posing a threat to their future as a religious minority. They see political life through the prism of the Christian right far more than will other groups.
Even though individual Jews may not feel threatened by evangelicals, the perceived threat to Jewish identity leads to sharp reactions against evangelicals above and beyond the disagreements on issues underlying the "culture war." The history of anti-Semitism that led many Jews to flee to the United States and even within America have led Jews to feel insecure and apprehensive about the motives of others, especially those who have a religious social and 8 political agenda. Forty-three percent of Jews rated ther importance of the separation of church and state at either 9 or 10 on a 0-10 scale in the NJDC survey; only 9 percent saw the issue as unimporant (at zero or one).
Many Jews are especially sensitive to the Christian Right's belief that the renewal of the Jewish state is a prerequisite for the second coming of Jesus-and that the end of times, the final conflict between good and evil, will be played out in Israel, in Armageddon (the Israeli village of Meggido). The final conflict between God and the devil will end in a fiery battle in which Jews will either convert to Christianity and join others in leaving the earth or perish in the blaze that consumes all non-believers. Neither of these choices, popularized in the series of Left Behind novels, appeal to Jews. Jews do worry about the Christian Right's social agenda. But most of all, they worry that a fundamentalist America will have no place for Jews.
Many Jews see as a zero-sum fight for identity. The Christian Right fights for the introduction of prayer in schools, whereas most Jews (over two-thirds in the NJDC survey) favor a high wall of separation between church and state and say that this is an important issue. Jews see the Christian right as a threat to the religious liberty that has allowed Jews to flourish in the United States and believe that most fundamentalists are anti-Semitic (Wald and Sigelman, 1997, 155-156) . In a 1996 survey conducted by Queens University, 87 percent American fundamentalists expressed the belief that it is very important to encourage non-Christians to become Christians, compared to 56 percent of non-fundamentalist Christians; 65 percent disagreed that all religions are equally true, compared to 41 percent of non-fundamentalist Christians.
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American Jews do not need to feel personally threatened by fundamentalists. Yet they may feel less secure in their group identity and may worry that the Jewish people may be endangered, as has happened in other places at other times. As such their political identity will be shaped, at least in part, by such perceived threats to Jewish identity (Medding, 1997), much as African-American social and political identity is determined in no small part by perceived threat from the dominant white society (Blumer, 1958) . Endangered minorities see themselves as more vulnerable than majorities facing threat. So a political norm of supporting the party that has historically defended the underdog in general and Jews in particular becomes a rational strategy, Another source of identity for Jews is identification with Israel. Many American Jews have seen their fate as intertwined with the security of Israel and they will view political life through the prism of which party offers greater support for the Jewish state (cf. Miller, Wlezien, and Hildreth, 1991) . It should hardly be surprising that concern for Israel should be concentrated Clinton came from Jews (Friedman, 1993 (Oldmixon, Rosenson, and Wald, 2005) . President George W.
Bush worked hard to demonstrate his commitment to Israel, in contrast to his father. And many evangelical leaders have been vocal supporters of Israel in its conflict with the Palestinians. Nor is there much evidence of widespread support for Israel among the Christian right. Wald and Sigelman (1997, 157) (Oldmixon, Rosenson, and Wald, 2005; Wald and Sigelman, 1997, 157) 
The Jewish Vote and the Non-Jewish Vote
We expect party identification, the direction of the country, and ideology to shape the behavior of both Jews and non-Jews (Sigelman, 1991) . Stanley and Niemi (2005) minorities, civil rights, abortion rights, and gay rights (Glaser, 1997; Wald, 2003, 69) . We estimate the models of vote choice with probit analysis. We experimented with simultaneous equation estimation (two stage least squares) to control for the endogeneity of ideology and party identification. However, the instruments available in the NJDC survey were very limited-and this led to models for vote choice, party identification, and ideology that were either too sparse or so similar to each other that key variables became insignificant in all of the models.
In probit models, the coefficients are non-linear, so they do not have straightforward interpretations as regression coefficients do. Instead, we estimate probit "effects" (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993)-changes in the probability of vote choice (or vote change) as we move from the minimum to the maximum values of each predictor. For some highly skewed independent variables, we restrict the ranges of the effects to values of the independent variables at less extreme bounds (at 20% and 80% of the distributions).
Our model of vote choice for American Jews includes party identification, ideology, retrospective evaluations (the direction of the country), religiosity, standard demographics (gender, income, education, and age) and positions on key issues. The NJDC survey had a thin set of questions on issues, but it did have a wide range of questions on how important likely 14 voters saw a range of issues in shaping vote choice. Petrocik (1996) has shown that the two parties "own" a range of issues, so voters who are especially concerned with Israel or terrorism should be more likely to vote Republican-issues the President's party "owns"--while voters motivated more by health care or Iraq should be more likely to cast Democratic ballots. The 8 NJDC survey also includes questions on the importance of Iraq and the economy, and Israel.
Each of the issue measures except for health is based upon a dichotomous coding of the standard questions of what are the most important and second most important issues in the campaign (combined into a single measure for each issue). Health did not rank highly enough, so we use a 10 point issue importance measure for these issues in the survey.
The NJDC and ANES surveys both have questions on social issues, but they are rather different. The NJDC asked half of its sample whether they approved of gay civil unions (twothirds did). We imputed values for the other half sample. The ANES asked about approval of 9 gay marriage (44 percent of our voting sample approved and another 3 percent accepted civil unions). The ANES had questions on when abortion should be allowed and whether gun possession should be made more difficult. The NJDC only had feeling thermometers on pro-life activists and for the National Rifle Association (both with mean scores of 20). So we need to be cautious when we compare the effects of these social issues across surveys.
Israel is one of two issues that are distinctive to Jewish voters. We expect that Jews who see Israel as a central issue in the election or who are strongly pro-Israel will be more likely to vote Republican. Since very few non-Jews see Israel as a critical issue, we do not posit a link between issue salience and vote choice for non-Jews. We include the Israel thermometer in the equations for non-Jews and we have a weak expectation that higher values on the thermometer will lead to a greater likelihood of voting Republican.
Evaluations of evangelical Christians on the feeling the thermometer should be an important factor in vote choice, but primarily for Jews. For non-Jews, the thermometer is for "Christian fundamentalists." We realize that evangelicals (in the NJDC survey) and Christian fundamentalists are not always the same. However, we believe that there would be little difference in the results for Jews had the NJDC survey asked about Christian fundamentalists and it is hardly clear that most non-evangelical respondents would make a clear distinction either.
Non-Jews might also use attitudes toward fundamentalists as a voting cue, reflecting their position in the "culture war." However, we would expect that the social issues and the overall ideological identification might reduce the impact of fundamentalists to insignificance.
We also expect greater likelihoods of voting Republican for our two measures of religiosity-frequency of attending religious services and being a member of a religious organization. Higher income and more education should make people more likely to vote Republican; older people should also tilt toward the Republicans, while women and AfricanAmericans (in the non-Jewish models only) should be more likely to vote Democratic. We present our model of vote choice for Jews in 2004 in Table 1 rated evangelicals so highly and barely more than 10 percent were above the neutral score of 50.
Negative attitudes toward evangelicals played a central role in keeping Jewish voters in the
Democratic fold. Table 1 about here Attachment to Israel, on the other hand, pushed voters to the Republican party.
_________________
Respondents who said that Israel was one of the two most important issues in the election-15 percent in total-were 18 percent more likely to vote for Bush. And voters who rated Israel far more highly than the Palestinians were 11 percent more likely to vote for Bush than those who had the opposite sympathies in the Middle East-an effect about the same as we find for the evangelical thermometer. A Jewish voter who rated Israel as one of the two most important issues would still have a .70 probability of voting for Kerry until her evangelical thermometer score crossed the neutral score of 50 -which was true of just two percent of the NJDC sample.
The impact of the importance of the Israeli issue was very powerful, but only among a handful of
Jewish voters. Thirty-six percent of Jewish supporters of Bush rated Israel as one of the most important issues, compared to just 8 percent of Kerry's backers (see Table 2 ). The effect of attitudes toward evangelicals was just half of that for Israel's importance, but it shaped the vote choices of far more Jewish voters. Table 2 about here Positive evaluations of Israel had little effect on Jewish voters. The coefficient is positive, indicating that higher scores on the thermometer led to more support for Kerry. But this result is clearly spurious, as we can see in Table 2 , where we present descriptive statistics. For the NJDC sample, the mean Israel thermometer is marginally higher for Bush than for Kerry. Voters who saw terrorism as a key issue were also more likely to vote for Bush, by almost 9 percent. This might appear to be part of a general hawkish syndrome based upon support for Israel and a concern for terrorism. But it isn't. The correlation between the importance of the two issues is exactly zero. So there are independent effects of foreign policy concerns working to benefit the Republicans in 2004 among Jewish voters. A Jewish voter who rated both Israel and terrorism as among the top two issues and was at the mean for evangelical evaluations had a twothirds probability of voting Democratic, still substantial but considerably less than the sample average (80 percent). Such voters made up only three percent of the NJDC sample (23 voters).
________________
Only four percent rated both of these issues as critical and only 6 percent rated Israel as critical and were at or above the mean on the evangelical thermometer. More religious Jews were more likely to vote Republican. Attending synagogue weekly makes a person seven percent more likely to back Bush; and being a member of a Jewish organization leads to a three percent increment in voting Republican. Orthodox Jews were more likely to vote for Bush-51 percent did so. But Orthodoxy was highly correlated with the other religiosity measures and was not significant, so we excluded it from this analysis. Most issue positions don't matter-neither does ideology. We present our model of vote choice for non-Jews in Table 3 below. We estimate the same equation twice, once including evangelicals and once excluding them-so that our estimate for the effect of fundamentalist sentiments does not depend upon evangelicals' own views about themselves. We construct our issue importance variables from the most important issue 12 question. The ANES asked only one question on the most important problem but it did ask about the importance of other issues (such as health care). Instead of the "direction of the country," as in the NJDC, the ANES has a measure of whether the country is on the right track. Table 3 about here The estimations for all non-Jews and non-evangelicals are generally very similar. The models once more are very successful, with over 90 percent of vote choices predicted correctly.
The key difference between Jews and non-Jews in 2004 is reflected in the null models, which are based upon modal vote choices. For Jews, prediction that all cases fall into the modal category leads to an 80 percent success rate with no predictors (the null model); for non-Jews, it is 53.9 percent with evangelicals included and 53.6 with them excluded.
As with Jews, the strongest effects come from party identification, whether the country is on the right track, and the importance of the health care issue. With evangelicals included, there are also significant coefficients for ideology, and gay marriage-but these issues drop to insignificance when we exclude evangelicals. The "culture war" on gay marriage and ideology more generally is to a considerable extent driven by the issue conflicts between evangelicals and others. However, the effect of abortion is even stronger when we exclude evangelicals: People who believe that abortion should always be allowed are between 10 and 13 percent (with or without evangelicals in the data set) more likely to vote Democratic. Opposition to gun control shifts vote choice to the Republicans by about 10 percent among non-Jews regardless of the sample. The religiosity variables are insignificant (due to collinearity with evaluations of fundamentalists and the social issues), as are all demographics except for education (and this becomes insignificant as well when we take evangelicals out of the sample) and race.
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Some of the key factors shaping the Jewish vote are insignificant for non-Jews. Neither the fundamentalist feeling thermometer nor attitudes toward Israel is significant in either model fo non-Jews. There are few non-Jews who rate fundamentalists at either extreme, so we calculated the effects between scores of 40 and 75, which represent respectively the 20% and 80% points in the distributions. For both non-Jewish estimates, the changes in probability from ratings of 40 to 75 is only a 1 percent boost in the likelihood of voting Republican. The importance of terrorism as an issue does lead to a boost in Republican voting, but it is only 4.5 percent, half the value that we found for Jews.
Jews and non-Jews both respond to the "typical" factors of the state of the country and
especially to party identification. Non-Jews seem to be motivated more by social issues, largely because they have less consensus on these issues than do Jews. While the measures on social issues are not comparable, we see a clear skew to the left on abortion, gay unions, and guns, while we see a much greater dispersion for non-Jews. And the key cultural issues that matter to Jews-Israel and especially evaluations of fundamentalists/evangelicals-don't shape the political choices of non-Jews. Issues of central concern to Jews as part of their identity don't matter when identity is not at stake. We estimated a similar model to the our overall ANES equation for evangelicals, replacing thermometer scores for fundamentalists with similar ratings for Jews. And In the second part of Table 2 Table 4 are two other results. First, gun control is a less consistent part of the culture war than are gay unions or abortions. Attitudes toward firearms are only weakly related to the evangelical feeling thermometers, though they are more strongly related to ideology (except among evangelicals). Second and far more critical, the simple correlations with the evangelical/fundamentalist attitudes are far more strongly correlated with ideology, gay unions, and abortion views for non-Jews (and especially for evangelicals) than they are for Jews. There is a culture war syndrome among non-Jews (and especially for evangelicals) reflected in the simple correlations between the evangelical/fundamentalist thermometers and ideology, gay unions, and abortion. But the correlations are far weaker for Jews.
It is not simply that Jews have opted out of the culture war. The bottom part of Table 4 provides evidence that attitudes on gay unions and gun policy (the National Rifle Association thermometer) are strongly correlated with ideology (though abortion is more weakly related to liberal-conservative identification). The simple correlations between ideology and gay unions are larger for the non-Jewish samples (except for evangelicals).
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The larger story is that Jewish voters display a similar pattern of ideological divisions on social issues to non-Jewish voters. The key exception is for the evangelical thermometers. The higher correlations between social issues and ideology with the fundamentalist thermometers depress the effect of the religious thermometer on vote choice. The lower correlations between the evangelical thermometer and measures of ideology and social policy for Jewish voters: (1) do not depress the independent effects of evaluations of evangelicals on vote choice; and (2) indicates that attitudes toward the Christian right extend well beyond policy disagreement.
There is further support for our argument when we examine patterns of vote change from Half of all Jewish voters who switched to the Democrats rated evangelicals at zero; three quarters of switchers to Kerry rated evangelicals at 30 or less and 95 percent had a negative rating-compared to only two-thirds of non-Jews (see Table 2 ). 
Reprise
Why do Jews vote Democratic? Mostly for the same reasons others vote Democratic -they are liberal. Jewish voters generally respond to national events in much the same way as non-Jews (Sigelman, 1991) . Even when Jews follow the crowd, they do it to a different beat.
When other groups deserted the Democrats, the Jews have mostly remained loyal. Jews may vote for Democrats less frequently from time to time, but they usually give more support to their favored party than non-Jews. Like the cat that always came back, Jews seem to boomerang back to the Democratic party.
Much of this is traceable to Jews' greater liberalism. Yet, there is something more than issue positions. We believe, following Medding (1977) that Jewish political loyalties depend at least in part on how secure they feel in their surroundings. When Jews feel that their identity is threatened, they turn against the parties that they perceive to be threatening.
In recent years, even though Republicans have moved closer to Jews on Israel than in the past, they have not romanced the Jews as the Democrats have for many years. Many of Bill Clinton's Cabinet and close advisers were Jewish, as were both of his Supreme Court appointees.
Clinton learned a few words of Hebrew ("Shalom, haver," or "goodbye, friend") to speak at the (Fuchs, 1956, 110) We have some indirect evidence as to why attitudes toward evangelicals mattered in 2004, perhaps more so than in the past. Jewish concern about evangelicals is hardly new: A 1964 survey of anti-Semitic attitudes in the United States by the fraternal organization B'nai Brith (Glock, Selznick, Stark, and Steinberg, 1964) revealed much stronger negative attitudes toward Jews among fundamentalists than among other Americans. Fundamentalists scored significantly higher than other Americans on two overall measures of anti-Semitism (by 54 to 27 percent anti-Semitic on the first scale and by 58 percent to 28 percent on the second), were more likely (by 58 to 48 percent) to say that Jews were responsible for the death of Christ, were more likely to say that Even in 1980, Jews seemed less polarized in how they rated party-leaning groups than others. Jews rated "Democratic groups" at a mean thermometer rating of 50.8, compared to 44.8 for "Republican groups," including anti-abortionists and Christian fundamentalists (Miller, Wlezien, and Hildreth, 1991, 1146) . Throughout the 1980s, evangelicals became a more prominent force within the Republican coalition, but the leaders of the Republican party were not clearly identified with the Christian right. Ronald Reagan was sympathetic to many of the fundamentalists' goals, but he put little effort into pressing for its agenda and, through his Hollywood ties, was comfortable in his dealings with Jews. George H.W. Bush was a mainline 31 Protestant (Episcopalian) who was not close at all to the Christian right. Senator Bob Dole ( R, KS), the 1996 nominee, was even further removed from the fundamentalists. George W. Bush was the first Republican nominee to identify closely with the Christian right-and this identity mobilized even less committed fundamentalists to stronger Republican party identification than in previous years (Layman and Hussey, 2005) . In 2004, more than in any other election, the schema of competing identities (Jewish versus fundamentalist) was activated-leading some Jews to defect from the party of the Christian right. Many other Jews, of course, were motivated more by the traditional economic and especially social issues that have long kept them Democrats.
American Jews are fighting two culture wars that are not part of the larger "culture war" in American society. One promises to bring them into an alliance with the dominant coalition in American society-ironically led by forces in the Jewish community, the Orthodox, who are most likely to see themselves as a people apart. The other brings them into conflict with the regime party, by stressing the threat to Jewish identity from a force that they see as making it impossible to assimilate without being absorbed. This is likely to be the major political conflict within American Jewry in coming years. Entries are zero-order correlations with all signs reflected except for vote choice. 
7.
The "most hostile" segment of the Jewish sample were respondents who rated evangelicals at zero on the 0-100 scale.
8.
We also constructed measures of the importance of moral issues, taxes, Social Security, education, the environment, and the economy, but none were significant, so we dropped them from the model we report.
9.
The NJDC survey asked the gay marriage question of only half of the sample. To get a larger N, we imputed values for the other half of the sample. The variables we used to impute gay marriage support were: income, gender, the evangelical thermometer, the prolife thermometer, the importance of terrorism, health, abortion, the environment, Social Security, education, Iraq, poverty, and moral issues, being single, and being widowed. All were significant at least at p < .10 and the regression had an adjusted R of 2
